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Abstract: This paper develops a conception of reflexive economic agents as an
alternative to the standard utility conception, and explains individual identity in terms of
how agents adjust to change in a self-organizing way, an idea developed from Herbert
Simon. The paper distinguishes closed equilibrium and open process conceptions of the
economy, and argues the former fails to explain time in a before-and-after sense in
connection with Aristotle’s sea battle problem. A causal model is developed to represent
the process conception, and a structure-agency understanding of the adjustment behavior
of reflexive economic agents is illustrated using Merton’s self-fulfilling prophecy analysis.
Simon’s account of how adjustment behavior has stopping points is then shown to
underlie how agents’ identities are disrupted and then self-organized, and the identity
analysis this involves is applied to the different identity models of Merton, Ross, Arthur,
and Kirman.

Finally, the self-organization idea is linked to the recent ‘preference

purification’ debate in bounded rationality theory regarding the ‘inner rational agent
trapped in an outer psychological shell,’ and it is argued that the behavior of selforganizing agents involves them taking positions toward their own individual identities.
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JEL codes: B11, B25, B41
1

1

The identity of reflexive economic agents

Reflexive economic agents continually revise their expectations of the future and
continually adjust their behavior to those changing expectations. This paper develops a
conception of reflexive economic agents as an alternative to the standard utility
conception of economic agents, and explains their individual identities terms of how they
adjust to change, rather than in terms of fixed preferences. The idea that identity might
lie in change rather than fixity may at first appear paradoxical, but I draw on Herbert
Simon and the idea of self-organization to motivate it. Simon dismissed the exogenous
preferences utility function representation of agents as inadequate to the task of
explaining behavior in complex, changing environments (Simon, 1956, 138), and
recommended we replace it with a conception of endogenous agents whose “behavior is
shaped by a scissors whose blades are the structure of task environments and the
computational capabilities of the actor” (Simon, 1991, 7). I use this idea to extend Simon’s
idea of self-organizing systems to agents, reasoning that just as he thought we ought to
explain the behavior of complex systems “in terms of the concepts of feedback and
homeostasis” (Simon, 1962, p. 467), so we should also explain the nature of economic
agents “in terms of the concepts of feedback and homeostasis.” Indeed, I argue that
treating complex economic processes as reflexive and self-organizing entails we also
should explain agents and their behavior as reflexive and self-organizing.
Needless to say, the identity focus of this paper departs from the main concern with
Simon’s thinking associated with his idea of bounded rationality (cf. Grűne-Yanoff,
Marchionni, and Moscati, 2014).1

I agree that explaining bounded rationality is

important to economics, but my view is that a bounded rationality and a bounded
individuality are two sides of one issue (Davis, 2015).

Since the utility function

representation of individual identity is formally derived from the axiomatic
representation of preferences, behavioral anomalies associated with the latter imply we
lack an adequate definition of what individuals are. Indeed, how boundedly rational
individuals can or should be explained is precisely the issue in a recent symposium and
exchange in Journal of Economic Methodology between Gerardo Infante, Guilhem
1

See the special December 2014 issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology on bounded rationality and the
Grűne-Yanoff, Marchionni, and Moscati introduction to the issue.
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Lecouteux, and Robert Sugden and Daniel Hausman regarding ‘preference purification’
– or how we might “reconstruct individuals’ underlying or latent preferences by
simulating what they would have chosen, had they not been subject to reasoning
imperfections” (Infante, Lecouteux, and Sugden, 2016a, p. 6; cf. Hausman, 2016; cf.
Infante, Lecouteux, and Sugden, 2016b).2 The symposium debates whether bounded
rationality implies a dualistic view of the self, and focuses on the idea that agents weigh
their options rather than simply respond to them. In my view, this asks, in Simon’s terms,
whether boundedly rational individuals are self-organizing, and this is the issue I
consequently investigate in this paper, if in a different connection than the symposium.
The argument of the paper, however, does not start with individual agents but with
discussion of two characterizations of the economy as a whole – the standard static
equilibrium conception and an alternative dynamic economic process conception. My
view is that the problematic character of the utility conception and the advantages of a
reflexive agent conception are respectively tied to the problematic character of the
standard static equilibrium conception and the advantages of the dynamic process
conception. I thus begin in section 2 with a critical review of standard equilibrium
thinking using Aristotle’s classic sea battle tomorrow problem, and argue that the
standard view employs an equilibrium-shock model that cannot explain time in a beforeand-after sense because it employs a closed systems view of the economy. In section 3, I
turn to the idea of a reflexive economic process, and use the truth-reversing properties of
self-fulfilling prophecies as a special kind of reflexive judgment to show how reflexive
economic systems are open process systems in which behavior has a before-and-after
character. I provide a causal model of how a reflexive economic system operates through
feedback channels, characterize open systems as non-ergodic on reflexivity grounds, and
finally return to Aristotle’s sea battle problem.
Section 4 discusses the utility conception of the agent, and argues that if we say that the
economy functions as an open, reflexive process, then it is misguided to think preferences
should be complete, unless agents construct them as such themselves. Alternatively, it
seems we should rather ask what sort of choice behavior is consistent with how we
2

The expression ‘preference purification’ is Hausman’s (2012), though see his many caveats, especially in Hausman
(2016).
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understand action and time. I characterize this behavior as adjustment behavior, which
introduces the following section’s treatment of reflexive economic agents. In section 5,
following Simon, I first explain adjustment behavior in terms of its moving to stopping
points. I then advance a general account of individual agent identity in which an
endogenous shock event disrupts an existing basis on which agents’ individual identities
operate, and their adjustment involves them self-organizing themselves on some new
basis on which their individual identities subsequently operate.

I give four examples

from the literature to show how different models of behavior emphasize change in the
sub-personal and/or supra-personal dimensions of identity, and then use the idea of selfdefeating prophecies to characterize agents’ own orientation on their identities. Section
6 comments briefly on the paper’s arguments.

2

Standard theory’s equilibrium-shock model and time

The standard Nash definition of equilibrium in economics is defined as a state of affairs
fully at ‘rest,’ meaning no agent has an interest in deviating from the allocation of
resources and strategies associated with that state. That is, it is a state of perfect
coordination of all agents’ plans and the idea of a perfectly static state of affairs. Consider
the application of this conception to the Walrasian understanding of a general
equilibrium of markets, the dominant framework employed by economists to explain the
market economy. Equilibrium is then a perfectly static state of affairs in the infrequently
appreciated sense that, according to the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results regarding
multi-market general equilibria, equilibria generally cannot be shown to be stable (Rizvi,
2006). This means that the standard equilibrium conception cannot explain movements
from out-of-equilibrium to equilibrium, or how an economy gets into equilibrium, and
thus refers to a perfectly static state of affairs in the further sense that it lacks any internal
principle of motion. An equilibrium just is, full stop, as shown by the fact that only
existence (and even not the uniqueness) of equilibrium can be shown. This renders
comparative static analysis, the work-horse of standard theory, essentially meaningless,
because comparative static analysis is about getting into a new equilibrium given a ‘shock’
to an old equilibrium. But if the theory lacks any internal principle of motion associated
4

with how an economy gets into equilibrium, does the idea of shocks suggests a theory of
externally caused motion associated with how an economy can get out of equilibrium?
My hypothesis is that the standard view of equilibrium as a perfectly static state of affairs
with no internal principle of motion renders the ‘equilibrium-shock’ model of external
motion philosophically problematic. To argue this, I claim that the ‘equilibrium-shock’
model of motion cannot address an ancient philosophical problem associated with the
relation of truth claims to time, which first emerged as the problem of future contingents
advanced by Aristotle in his famous sea battle tomorrow example (Aristotle 1963). Future
contingents are statements about future states of affairs that are neither necessarily true
nor false today. For Aristotle, that a sea battle will not be fought tomorrow is neither
necessarily true nor false today. Suppose, then, that a sea battle will not be fought
tomorrow. If a sea battle will not be fought tomorrow, then it was true yesterday that it
will not be fought tomorrow. Yet since all past truths are necessary truths, it must also be
necessarily true today that a sea battle will not be fought tomorrow. However, this
conclusion is fatalistic and runs counter to our intuitions about the future being open.
Thus any theory that employs future contingents needs an answer to Aristotle.
Consider the standard ‘equilibrium-shock’ model of external motion regarding how an
economy can get out of equilibrium. A shock is an event in time because it differentiates
before and after. On the one hand, then, from the perspective of a given equilibrium, a
shock event is a future contingent state of affairs, something that could occur, and as such
its occurrence should be neither necessarily true nor false. On the other hand, given that
an equilibrium is a perfectly static state of affairs, shocks are fully external to any given
equilibrium configuration.

Thus from the perspective of any given equilibrium

configuration, shocks necessarily do not occur. Equilibrium is forever. But then without
shocks there is no differentiation of time into before and after, so the ‘equilibrium-shock’
model fails as a theory of externally caused motion. Note also that the failure of this
conception is due to the lack of any internal principle of motion in the standard
equilibrium conception, which as a fully complete, static representation of the economy,
closes off any role for external causal factors. Just as necessarily there can be no sea battle
tomorrow, so there can never be equilibrium shocks tomorrow.

5

Aristotle, in fact, similarly diagnosed the problem of future contingents as a problem of
completeness, specifically, completeness with respect to the scope of application of the
logical principle of bivalence – the idea that every statement must be either true or false
– to any and all statements irrespective of their temporal dimensions. His solution to the
problem and escape from fatalism was to say that the principle of bivalence applies to the
future differently than it applies to the past and the present, though what he meant by
this and what philosophers have argued this could mean is much disputed in the history
of logic and philosophy (see Rice 2014), and will not detain me here. Instead, in the next
section I will discuss why we cannot always say that a statement about the future is true
or false when we operate with an open process conception of the economy, and here only
comment on why it may seem odd for me to have used the problem of future contingents
to comment on standard equilibrium theory.
That oddness, I believe, comes from combining a discussion of how truth is determined
with the mathematics of equilibrium determination. A Nash representation of a set of
equilibrium strategies models a mathematical solution to a set of behavioral functions.
That it ‘models’ that solution and its attendant representation of ‘behavior’ tells us that
the empirical truth or falsity of the propositions involved is of no particular importance,
and indeed can even be set aside. Rather, the main thing that is important about that
representation of agents’ behavior is that it be mathematically consistent in the sense of
producing a solution to a set of equations.3 Indeed, the mathematical utility function
representation of agent behavior is not meant to be evaluated according to how well is
describes people’s behavior, but according to its mathematical tractability, so the
common complaint that this representation of agents is unrealistic basically aims at the
wrong target, at least according to its proponents.
The problem that Aristotle’s sea battle problem points us towards, then, is the sharp
divorce in mainstream economics between the logic of truth and the mathematics of
equilibrium determination. What I conclude from this, however, is not that we ought to
abandon mathematical representations, nor certainly that claims about the realism of
3

Hausman makes essentially this same point in connection with his distinction between theories and models
(Hausman, 1992, 70-82). Boumans does as well in discussion of models (Boumans, 2015). Lawson makes the point
in relation to the goals of consistency and realisticness (Lawson, 2013).
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economic theory are of no philosophical importance, but rather that realism and a
concern with how truth is determined ought to constrain and determine the nature of
mathematical reasoning in economics. In particular, then, I recommend that we abandon
mathematical representations of the economy that preclude employing before-and-after
treatments of time in favor of mathematical representations that allow for this.4
However, I leave the task of advancing alternative mathematical representations of the
economy to others, and in the following section give a philosophical characterization of
the economy as an open or endogenous process rather than as the closed system such as
standard equilibrium theory employs. There of course exists considerable philosophical
and methodological literature regarding the distinction between open and closed types of
systems in economics, much of which emphasizes uncertainty, but I adopt a somewhat
different entry point on the subject from many others by developing the open-closed
distinction in terms of the idea of reflexive economic processes driven by the behavior of
reflexive economic agents. This will in turn introduce my discussion of reflexive economic
agents in section 5. In the following section, then, I will emphasize how an open reflexive
economic process conception makes action and time central to the explanation of
economic systems, and offers one way of addressing Aristotle’s problem of future
contingents.

3

The reflexive economic process conception and time

A reflexive economic process is one in which agents form expectations and beliefs about
the future based on their understanding of the world, and this influences their actions in
the present, which in turn influences future states of the world. The conception of the
world as a reflexive economics process is thus a conception of action framed in beforeand-after terms. All economics, then, is in principle concerned explaining the world as a
reflexive economic process, since economic agents are assumed to form expectations and
beliefs about the future that affect their actions in the present.

4

In my opinion (and it is just an opinion), an alternative mathematical representation of the economic process that
accommodates a before-and-after treatment of time involves an algorithmic type of mathematics (cf. e.g., Velupillai,
2011).
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At the same time, the standard rationality theory treatment of equilibrium as a state of
affairs ultimately at ‘rest’ negates this before-and-after temporal dimension of action,
both in macroeconomics via the idea of rational expectations and in microeconomics via
the idea of optimal or Bayesian (and least-square) learning. In the macro case of rational
expectations agents’ expectations regarding the future are on average consistent with the
correct model of the world. In the micro case of optimal or Bayesian learning agents’
rational beliefs about the future smoothly converge on the correct model of the world.
When agents’ expectations and beliefs regarding the future are rational or on average
consistent with the correct model of the world, and when agents’ converge smoothly on
the correct model of the world, then the economy simply achieves the equilibrium values
inherent in agents’ model of the world as if time did not matter. Nominally agent’s
expectations of the future still influence their actions in the present, but this occurs in
such a benign way that one can ignore it and proceed as if there were no temporal
dimension to behavior.
This standard view, then, can nonetheless be represented in causal terms so as to
distinguish the direct effects of people’s actions on the world associated with agents’
models of the world and a feedback channel associated with how agents’
expectations/learning affect their models of the world. Agents’ actions a can then be said
to have direct effects on the world b, or a -> b:

a -> b

[1]

Thus, [1] represents agents’ model of the world. When agents form rational expectations
or optimally learn about this causal relation a -> b, and act on this basis, then the a -> b
relation acts reflexively on itself, and makes that model of the world self-confirming:

a -> b -> (a -> b)

[2]
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Then the combined overall effects, (=>), of the direct causal model [1] and the reflexive
feedback channel [2] produce both b and (a -> b):

a and a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b) => b and (a -> b)

[3]

Consequently, since a -> b and (a -> b) exhibit the same direct effect of a on b, the
feedback channel only plays a nominal role that can be ignored, the process is closed, and
the passage of time is effectively negated.
Contrast this with the case of an open, endogenous economic process where expectations
are not rational and learning is not optimal. Agents’ actions a have direct effects on b, but
since agents’ expectations and learning do not confirm [1], the feedback channel changes
the nature of the relation between a and b such that [2] is replaced as follows:

a -> b -> (a -> b)’

[4]

Replacing the a -> b relation by the (a -> b)’ relation, [3] is then replaced as follows:

a and a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b)’ => b and (a -> b)’

[5]

In this case, time operates in a substantial, before-and-after way on account of the
changed feedback channel. Were [5] to be the general case, and [3] a limiting case, then
across a sequence of periods in time agents would need to constantly adjust their causal
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models of the economy: (a -> b)’, (a -> b)’’, etc.5
The world in this second case, then, is open in the sense of being nonergodic and pathdependent due to how reflexive agents’ changing expectations and consequent actions
alter the relation between a and b in time.6

The limiting case rational

expectations/optimal learning view produces a closed systems approach because the
allowed operation of reflexivity only confirms the existing model of the economy. It also
allows the a -> b causal model of the economy to be reduced to a type of mathematical
expression which omits any real incorporation of time. All other types of expectations
and non-optimal learning are open systems approaches in that the operation of reflexivity
requires dynamic representations of the economy in before-and-after time via how
agents’ expectations and models of the economy are continually revised in terms of one
another. The principle of motion that these dynamic pathways exhibit is an endogenous
one in that the operation of reflexivity ensures that what occurs at one point in time
influences what occurs at a later point in time. Time is not an unconnected sequence of
independent states, as it must be represented in the equilibrium-shock model according
to the mathematical treatment of ‘shock’ as an ‘event’ outside the model, but rather a
connected process appropriate to our before-and-after representation of time. What is
principally different, then, about a reflexivity-based treatment of the open-closed systems
distinction is that it makes action and time central. That is, a reflexivity-based treatment
of the open-closed distinction is both an ontological treatment of that distinction, because
of the role of action, and also an epistemological one, because action is predicated on
agents’ state of knowledge.

5

Simon’s two blades process analysis is richer than [5] since he allows for the case in which a change in the
environment occurs independently of the effects of the feedback channel. I leave this additional layer of complexity
aside in order to emphasize the role of the feedback channel in order to focus on the behavior of reflexive agents in
section 5.
6
In Paul Davidson’s terms, the world is ‘transmutable’ (Davidson, 1996). At the same time, the world is only
‘evolutionary’ in the loosest sense of the term. Evolutionary processes, at least in the classical Darwinian sense,
basically occur ‘behind the backs’ of agents, whereas reflexive systems depend on how agents’ actions influences
the economy’s time path. See Barkley Rosser’s careful discussion of the meaning and interpretation of the concept
of nonergodicity in Post Keynesian economics emphasizing its relation to the concepts of non-stationarity and nonhomogeneity (cf. Rosser, 2015).
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But this causal analysis leaves unexplained just how ‘open’ an economic process
understood as endogenous and reflexive can be. Action influences the world and its time
path. Yet it could still be the case that the economy is an endogenous process due to less
than rational expectations, is a nonergodic system because action causes the phenomena
to be less than stationary, and yet the effects of agents’ behavior through the feedback
channel in the expectations-models adjustment process are sufficiently modest that it still
largely appears as if the world is an ergodic system in which time does not matter. After
all, as we know, in a large number of respects the world works pretty much the same way
day-in-day-out.
This then calls for closer attention to the nature of the expectations feedback channel, and
to do this I emphasize its agency-social structure character (Archer, 1995; Lawson, 1997),
and illustrate this with a special case, the now classic, highly stylized example of how a
feedback channel has significant effects on an economy’s time path, namely, Robert
Merton’s (1948) treatment of a bank run as a self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP). In his famous
Depression bank run example, a bank examiner mistakenly judges a bank will become
insolvent (an endogenous ‘shock’7), people act in conformity with this judgment causing
a bank run, and the bank becomes insolvent, thus fulfilling the examiner’s prediction or
prophecy. Rather, then, than explain the feedback channel in a purely epistemological
way in terms of only changes in beliefs or expectations, Merton characterizes the situation
in agency-social structural terms involving the agency interaction relationship between
the bank examiner’s actions and depositors’ actions which is embedded in and acts on the
social-institutional structure that determines how the banking system works. All this,
then, is what underlies the bank causal model a -> b that agents work with and the
expectations feedback channel a -> b -> (a -> b)’ that agents exercise when that causal
model is called into question.
If, then, a causal analysis of the economy as an open, endogenous process leaves
unexplained how ‘open’ an economic process might be, what a SFP does is provide a clear
measure of openness in the form of a truth reversal of agents’ judgments, where this
reversal in turn is the product of a whole set of changes in the attendant agency-social
7

It is endogenous because it arises from a judgment internal to the system as compared to an exogenous shock
brought about by an event outside that system.
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structure relationships. The bank examiner mistakenly judges the bank to be insolvent
when it is solvent, and this causes the bank to become insolvent on account of the nature
of the interaction between the examiner and depositors in the context of how the banking
system works. What was false is taken by depositors to be true, and then after the bank
run it is indeed true that the bank is insolvent because this agency-structure interaction
has changed what is true.
Of course the Merton bank run example is highly simplified case that exaggerates how
clearly agents’ interaction affects what is true. More often than not changes in what is
taken to be are not clear since our views about what is the case in the world with complex
social structures involves many claims and assumptions whose interconnected nature
makes it difficult to evaluate individual truth claims. But it would be a mistake to infer
that this Merton’s extreme truth reversal case is therefore unlikely to occur or that when
it does it is only on a small scale. As everyone now knows, the recent financial crisis was
essentially a banking crisis quite parallel to Merton’s bank run example in which banks
were judged solvent until they were successfully shorted and indeed became insolvent.
Those who shorted the banks, that is, played the role of Merton’s bank examiner,8 and the
crash in the overnight lending market played the role of Merton’s depositors.
So openness should be characterized not only in truth-functional terms but also in terms
of the social stability of beliefs. Depending on the domain, people’s beliefs are more or
less secure, and thus more or less subject to, or vulnerable to, a revision process in which
agents search for causal models a -> b and investigate possible feedback channels a -> b
-> (a -> b)’ regarding their strategies for revising those models. This makes just how
‘open’ an economic process is depend on the way in which the agency-structure
relationships are embedded in social institutions – obviously still a quite ‘open’ matter.
But this, I suggest, is what one should expect when one takes the economy to be an open,
endogenous and path-dependent process.9

8

The nature of a ‘short’ is to bet against the consensus view, or what is taken to be true, and a successful short
changes that view.
9
How much lock-in, then, economic processes exhibit (David, 1985) would seem to depend in part on how durable
the social-institutional foundations of social interaction are.
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This analysis, then, also points to one advantage of an open systems, agency-structure
approach to the economy over a mathematical representation of the economy.

A

mathematical representation of the economy as a complex dynamic process can map
changes in variables, and explain how an economy works in unexpected ways in terms of
the idea of phase transitions. But when do mathematically-described phase transitions
count as the economy working in an unexpected way and when do they count as it working
in pretty much the same way? In thermodynamics, a phase transition involves a clear
qualitative change since it involves a change from one state of matter to another, which
clearly marks out a before-and-after sequence. What counts as a change from one ‘state
of matter’ to another in the economic world? In social science changes in ‘states of matter’
are subject to judgments regarding what differences those changes make to agents. Thus
agents’ judgments about what is true or false ultimately determine what counts as a phase
transition, as when we say the characteristics of the economy after the financial crisis are
not true of the characteristics of an economy before the crisis.
From this vantage point, it seems a rather straightforward interpretation of Aristotle’s sea
battle tomorrow problem is as follows. Whether there is a sea battle tomorrow affects
many people, and thus many people would form expectations about this possibility.
Agents’ expectations of possible sea battle tomorrow, then, are likely to influence other
agents’ actions. Should these actions fulfill or defeat the expectation of a sea battle
tomorrow would then determine whether a sea battle occurs tomorrow. Thus the fatalism
paradox that Aristotle suggested fails since whether a sea battle occurs tomorrow is not
inevitable but depends on the actions people undertake. Indeed, Aristotle likely posed
the fatalist view as a reduction ad absurdum argument to show that the claim a sea battle
would or would not occur as inevitable was false and the paradox is not a paradox.
Accordingly, the key assumption the paradox makes that Aristotle likely believed to be
false was that action and truth are independent. If they are not, then action can change
what is true, and the future is open, not inevitable.

4

The utility conception of the economic agent and the completeness

assumption
13

I have claimed that rational choice theory’s standard utility function conception of the
economic agent goes hand-in-hand with standard theory’s equilibrium-shock model of
the economy. Rational choice theory is a normative theory of choice in that the utility
conception of the agent depends on axiomatic foundations which discipline what choices
agents ought to make. The axioms were originally taken to be self-evidently true, but the
consistency in choice they produce is as much a matter of consistency with the
equilibrium-efficiency properties of the standard equilibrium theory. The purpose of the
axioms governing utility functions, that is, is not just to prescribe consistent choices, but
to prescribe equilibrium-efficient consistent choices. But if standard equilibrium theory
is questionable in regard to our understanding of action and time, then searching for
axiomatic foundations for utility functions and rational choice seems misguided – the
project aptly dubbed the ‘preference purification approach.’10 Rather, one ought to ask
what behavior is consistent with how we understand action and time, and then explain
the foundations for that behavior with an appropriate understanding of the agent.
Consider the important completeness axiom, which says that the agent must be able to
compare any two imaginable states of the world, x and y, by a relation of preference R. If
the axiom does not hold, and individuals’ preferences are incomplete, much of standard
theory is called into question, including welfare analysis and the WARP axiom of revealed
preference theory. Why then might it fail? The most widely held answer is vagueness, or
that agents may be unable to clearly determine their preferences regarding vaguely
specified alternatives (Broome, 2004).

How, then, ought researchers understand

vagueness? The dominant response seems to be to investigate how though preferences
might be vague, but the completeness axiom can still be retained, or at least some
correlate assumption about preferences holds that largely serves the same purpose so that
agents’ choices are still effectively rational.

But I believe this strategy gets things

backward. Rather it would seem to make more sense to address incompleteness straight
on, and explain decision-making behavior on that basis, as does much of behavioral
economics, which has unmoored itself from rational choice.

10

See footnote 2.
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The motivations of behavioral economists, however, differ from mine. They largely set
aside the issue of how the economy as a whole should be represented in the interest of
achieving greater ground-up realism regarding choice. In contrast, if how we explain
behavior depends on how we explain the economy as a whole – in equilibrium terms or
process terms – then we ought to investigate vagueness and incompleteness as reflective
of agent behavior when we operate with a process conception of the economy. This is
indeed what the causal model analysis of the last section implies. Since the feedback
channel,

a -> b -> (a -> b)’

[4]

alters the a -> b relation, there is good reason to suppose that the b terms in a -> b and (a
-> b)’ are not comparable or perhaps only vaguely comparable. If the world has not
changed too much, then the completeness axiom might be retained not as an axiom but
as an observed relationship.

Its basis, that is, would not be the requirements of

equilibrium theory, but an assessment of how open or closed the world is in particular
circumstances when we explain the economy as an open reflexive process. That
assessment would also entail giving attention to the agency-structure background of the
change in question, since how inertial change is, and how complete preferences might be,
depends on how robust institutions governing social interaction are in making tomorrow
more or less like today. So in contrast to behavioral economists, I give the issue of
completeness reflexivity foundations, not psychological ones.
However, the general caution regarding the nature of preferences that behavioral
economists have advanced, that preferences are often not stable for a whole variety of
reasons, is still worth attention. Menu dependence, for example, tells us that a given set
of preferences need not be stable when events occur that alter menus. However, in my
view the more difficult issue here concerns preference formation. If the world is nonergodic, then new states of the world regularly appear. To suppose that options in new
states of the world can always be compared based on sets of preferences used to compare
15

options in past states of the world is heroic at best, since completeness has to then be
defined as an unknown ability individuals have that is everywhere and always versatile
and competent. This mystery flies in the face of clear, every day evidence that some
market participants actively work to manipulate other market participants’ preferences
(by often exploiting menu dependence). Of course the idea that preferences are not just
formed but are actually constructed by social forces has been around for a long time, and
indeed has also been off the agenda of mainstream economics for a long time. Why is this
when the world outside of economics does not regard preference manipulation as
controversial? Why do most economists neglect it? One answer is that questioning
preference autonomy undermines the independence of supply and demand and the
supply-and-demand balance on which standard economics relies. But that balance is
premised on the equilibrium-shock model being a correct since it is that balance which
mathematically ‘closes’ the model. Doubts on this score consequently unravel all that
depends on it right back to how we should interpret the completeness assumption.11
An alternative view of completeness is John Searle’s view that complete preferences are
“the product of practical reasoning” and not given characteristics of the individual (Searle,
2001, 253). I comment further on the identity implications of this idea below, and here
only connect it to the idea of a reflexive economic process. If we regard a reflexive
economic process as one that continually changes the world, then essentially preferences
are continually being made incomplete, so that the issue is rather how and whether they
might become complete through the actions of agents. This then makes adjustment
behavior central to our characterization of economic agents, and consequently I now go
on to how such agents can be understood both in terms of adjustment behavior and in
terms of identity.

5

The behavior and identity of reflexive economic agents

11

Questioning preference autonomy, clearly, also jeopardizes the basis on which individual identity operates in the
utility conception – in a circular way I have argued (e.g., Davis, 2011, pp. 6ff). If individuals’ sets of preferences are
what constitute their individual identities, and their preferences are influenced by others, what kind of ‘individuals’
are they? The problematic ‘inner self’ view is one strategy to respond to this.
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I argued at the outset that explaining complex economic processes as reflexive and selforganizing entails explaining agents in such processes as reflexive and self-organizing.
My goal in this section of the paper, then, is link my section 3 account of reflexive
economic processes to an explanation of the behavior and identity of reflexive economic
agents in terms of their ability to adjust the grounds for their behavior in a self-organizing
way in response to change in their environments. I see two steps involved to doing this.
First, I need to explain agents’ adjustment behavior in terms of how it continues to a
stopping point. Adjustment processes are not open-ended, as Simon made clear with his
satisficing idea. They involve a response to an event that initiates them, and they run their
course when agents have adjusted to that event. Second, I need to explain how agents’
adjustment behavior causes them to self-organize their identities as individual economic
agents at such stopping points. To explain the idea of agents’ identities as self-organizing,
I argue that reflexive processes can disrupt agents’ individual identities, and their
adjustment and self-organization comes about through their re-organization of these
identities. I illustrate this first using Merton’s bank run example, and then generalize that
explanation to three additional examples.
First, to explain adjustment behavior, I follow Simon’s explanation in terms of satisficing,
which he understood to be a matter of reaching an aspiration level. The two questions
Simon’s explanation naturally raises are: how are aspiration levels set, and how does one
know when they are achieved? His ‘two blades of the scissors’ answer was that agents’
aspiration levels depend on the type of process in which the agent is involved, and their
achievement depends on how the agent adjusts within that process (Simon, 1955, 111113).12 Consider, then, the reflexive economic process that I outlined above in connection
with Merton’s SFP bank run example. There the bank examiner’s evaluation of the bank
affects depositors’ view of the bank’s solvency, this feeds back on and changes their causal
model of the bank and also their behavior, and this produces the bank run. Depositors’
adjustment behavior is thus caused by the reversal in judgment about the bank’s solvency.
This then tells us both how aspiration levels are set and how one knows when they are
achieved. The new judgment that the bank is insolvent when it was previously believed
12

In terms of process, Simon argued that decision makers’ aspiration levels rise or fall as the alternatives they face
are respectively easy or difficult to discover.
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solvent sets depositors’ new aspiration levels (to withdraw all their deposits) and also
drives their adjustment behavior (withdrawing their deposits) to the stopping point (full
withdrawal of deposits) at which they achieve their aspiration level.
We can increase the realism of this account by explaining how this reflexive process works
in agency-structure terms. At the outset, the bank examiner and depositors interact in a
socially structured way determined according to how banking laws work, monetary
systems, and financial markets are organized. The basis on which they interact is then
disrupted by the agency of the bank examiner (agency affecting social structure). The
ensuing withdrawal adjustment process on the part of depositors reflects the effects of
their re-aligning their judgments about the bank to the bank examiner’s judgment. In
effect, then, the bank examiner sets an aspiration level inconsistent with the existing basis
on which the examiner-depositor relationship operates, so depositors’ withdrawals must
proceed until the results of their actions conform to this new aspiration level, and thereby
establish the new basis on which the examiner-depositor relationship operates. At the
same time, the banking system and how markets are organized has been affected by the
bank’s failure. In agency-structure terms, the agency of the bank examiner has influenced
social structure, and the consequent adjustment within that structure has changed the
basis on which this agency-structure relationship will subsequently operate.
Second, then, to explain how agents’ adjustment behavior leads them to self-organize
themselves as individual economic agents, note how in Merton’s example the bank
examiner’s evaluation affects depositors’ identities.

Before the evaluation becomes

known depositors’ identities are tied to their individual interests alone, since the earnings
on their deposits accrue to them individually. However, when that evaluation becomes
known, depositors recognize they then also have social identities as depositors since each
has the same interest as every other depositor, and each acts on the same basis as every
other depositor in withdrawing their funds. That is, all depositors now see themselves as
representative agents of the group of depositors, and act as a representative depositor
would act. Yet at the same time, though depositors adopt this depositor social identity,
they nonetheless still retain and are still motivated by their individual identities, since
they know that if they fail to withdraw their own funds when others are withdrawing
theirs, that they will lose their funds individually in the bank failure, and put their
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individual identities at risk. They thus act on both identities, both in social identity terms
as representative agent depositors and in individual identity terms as independent agents.
However, when the bank run has run its course, their social identity as depositors ceases
to be relevant, their individual self-interested identities fully occupy them. That is, they
have self-organized themselves in terms of those individual identities. In Simon’s terms,
then, the stopping point in his satisficing-aspiration level explanation of an adjustment
process is also a stopping point in agents’ self-organizing identity adjustment.
The general view, then, is that an endogenous shock event disrupts an existing basis on
which agents’ individual identities operate, and their adjustment involves them selforganizing themselves on some new basis on which their individual identities
subsequently operate. Below, I further explain the two sides of this analysis in reflexivity
terms, the disruption side and the self-organizing side, by demonstrating the
complementarity between SFPs on the disruption side and self-defeating prophecies
(SDPs) on the self-organizing side. But to better prepare the ground for this I first give
three more examples to generalize from the Merton example.
Consider, then, Don Ross’s neurocellular account of individual identity. Ross argues that
individuals are made up of collections of sub-personal neural agents or neurons, their
sub-personal multiple selves, which interact in coordination games internal to the
individual to produce individual identity (Ross, 2005, 2006, 2007). These sub-personal
neural agents each act in their own interest, and compete for bodily resources as relatively
independent agents and individual identities. The human body, of course, is regularly
affected by any number of psycho-physical events that influence how these sub-personal
agents interact and coordinate in order to serve their own individual identity interests. I
characterize these events as endogenous shocks that disrupt an existing neural agent
coordination, and the adjustment to a new neural agent coordination as the selforganization of a new individual identity. Ross’s explanation is more sophisticated than
this outline because he also discusses at length how the interaction between individuals
compels each individual’s sub-personal neural agents’ coordination.13 Nonetheless, his
model illustrates the general one suggested above: an endogenous shock to an existing

13

For example, see his discussion of language (Ross, 2007).
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identity basis followed by self-organizing adjustment to a new identity basis. The main
difference from the Merton example is in the forms of identity involved. If Merton’s
process goes from individual identity to individual identity with social identity to
individual identity,

I -> I/SD -> I’

Ross’s process,

I/MS -> I’/MS’

goes from one individual identity with multiple selves to a differently organized individual
identity with multiple selves.
For a related individual identity/multiple selves case, consider the Santa Fe artificial stock
market model developed by complexity researchers under Brian Arthur’s leadership
(Arthur, 1995; Arthur et al., 1997). Profit-maximizing agents have the task of investing in
a single asset, and form multiple subjective expectation models regarding what moves the
market price of that asset. Different agents prioritize different models, and in a trading
day the price of that asset moves to a value that reflects the distribution of these different
expectation models across agents. How well agents do in terms of profits with their
respective prioritizing at each stage of the process, then causes them to re-order their
expectation models to improve performance in subsequent rounds. Seen in evolutionary
terms, agents’ models take on a life of their own as they effectively compete with one
another through the intermediary of investors.

These models effectively ‘inhabit’

investors, and are thus like Ross’s sub-personal agents or neural multiple selves. One
difference is that investors are ordered collections of such models whereas the ordering
principle for Ross’s whole individuals is a coordination equilibrium. In identity terms,
however, the analysis is formally parallel – I/MS -> I’/MS’ – though rules or expectation
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models are not internal to investors in the way neural selves are internal to people. The
Santa Fe artificial stock market model of course does not work as a coordination game,
but rather as an evolving complex dynamic system. Its periodization through successive
trading rounds nonetheless lends it a disruption-adjustment pattern that works through
identity change in self-organizing investors’ constant re-ordering of their expectation
models.14
Last, moving away from multiple selves approaches and back to social identity approaches
like Merton’s, consider the Marseille fish market analysis developed by Alan Kirman and
his colleagues (Kirman, 2011, 72-109). In the late 1980s the Marseille market was
reorganized in such a way as to allow it to function as an open, arms-length auction type
process as in standard competitive theory. What was observed, however, is that buyers
and sellers instead formed close contacts, interacted directly rather than indirectly with
one another, and developed preferences regarding partnering with some people versus
others. That is, rather than a typical competitive auction process, trading networks
emerged which segregated buyers and sellers into different loyalty relationships. These
loyalty relationships, then, are a partnership type of social identity (rather than social
group type social identity as in Merton’s example) that individual buyers and sellers adopt
alongside their individual identities. Thus, since buyers and sellers came to the market
as individual identities under the disruption associated with the market’s reorganization
as an auction, their adjustment to the new market organization involves them layering
these new loyalty social identities onto their individual identities,

I -> I/SD

and self-organizing themselves on that basis, unlike in Merton’s example where they
move back to individual identities alone. Later, this analysis was extended in a different

14

More fully, since the market continually evolves, the expectation models that individuals are made up of also
continually evolve. Thus the analysis allows that new expectation models may emerge as combinations of old ones,
and the identity scheme is better represented as I/MS -> I’/MS’ -> ….
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context to the social group type of social identity, such as individuals joining groups that
function like clubs (Horst, Kirman, and Teschl, 2007).15
What is the general form of the explanation, then, across these four examples? Turning
to the two sides of the analysis, the disruption side and the self-organizing side, I argue
that as reflexive processes they exhibit a complementarity which can be explained in
terms of the complementarity between SFPs on the disruption side and self-defeating
prophecies (SDPs) on the self-organizing side. A SFP, as in Merton’s example, makes
something false become true due to how people react to some event, whereas a SDP makes
something true become false due to how people react to some event. The now classic
stylized example in this case is the failure of the Y2K prophecy that computers would all
fail at the beginning of the year 2000. It seems that this would indeed have happened,
but the prediction that it would led computer engineers to re-appraise their existing a ->
b model of computers, and act in such a way as to instantiate a new (a -> b)’ model that
secured computer systems against breakdown. Rather than the disruption that SFPs
involve, SDPs thus deliver systems from disruption by making the undesirable, imminent,
true states of affairs they involve false states of affairs through the actions agents
undertake on their view of those undesirable state of affairs. In agency-structure terms,
SDPs exhibit the tendency of social structures to re-stabilize themselves in response to
endogenous agency shocks.
In identity terms, SDPs are an adjustment response to an identity disruption, whatever
its origin, that precludes what would be the case from becoming the case. For Merton,
depositors see their individual identities as linked to their social identities, and act so as
to avoid losing their funds. For Ross, the appearance of new coordination equilibria for
an individual’s neural selves prevents the individual from being incapacitated. For Arthur
and his colleagues, investors re-order their expectation models of the asset price to
prevent themselves from losing money. For Kirman and his colleagues, buyers and sellers
form loyalty relationships to forestall undesirable atomistic trading outcomes.
15

Clubs exhibit high excludability and low rivalry. Horst et al. argue that adding new members changes the character
of the club. Thus the social identity character of that club evolves as new individuals join it, just as the identity of
individuals change when they become club members.
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Seen in this way, however, there is an asymmetry between SFPs and SDP behaviors.
Adjustment in the case of a SFP is reactive and backward-looking whereas adjustment in
the case of a SDP is prospective and forward-looking. At the same time, the asymmetry
between SFP and SDP behaviors goes beyond different orientations toward time because
SDP behavior also involves individuals taking a position in regard their own identities
framed by the goal of self-organization. This is where the debate in the Journal of
Economic Methodology between Infante, Lecouteux, and Sugden and Hausman in my
view comes into play. They ask whether there is some kind of option weighing activity in
which individuals engage, the effect of which would be to remove the possibility that
individuals are dual selves. Implicitly, then, they ask whether individuals can effectively
‘step outside of themselves’ to take positions on their own identities framed by the goal of
self-organization.
What it consequently seems they are addressing is the need for some sort of hierarchical
or multi-level conception of individuals with a reflexive capacity to manage their behavior
based on the goal of individual self-organization.

In SFP behavior, individuals’

organization of their sub-personal and/or supra-personal identities is disrupted, but in
SDP behavior individuals take a position toward this disruption of themselves, where that
position involves setting out a behavioral course of action meant to re-organize their subpersonal and/or supra-personal identities.
My argument in terms of SFPs and SDPs, then, may seem unduly labored. However, its
ultimate rationale is simply to argue that individual behavior and identity needs to be
understood in terms of some sort of capacity to reflexively orient on that behavior and
identity, a type of idea which has had little place in the theory of decision-making in
economics, with a few exceptions. Most notable in this latter regard is Amartya Sen’s
representation of agents’ overall identities that distinguishes on one level three different
types of ‘privateness’ or kinds of individual identities that need to be managed (selfcentered welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-goal choice) and on another level altogether
a “fourth aspect of self” associated with being able to engage in “reasoning and selfscrutiny” and “examine of one’s values and objectives and choose in the light of those
values and objectives” associated with those types of privateness (Sen, 2002, 33-36; cf.
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Davis, 2007, 2011).16 Searle, I suggested, reasons in a related in way in his emphasis on
practical reasoning, arguing that it is a mistake to think that complete “preferences are
given prior to practical reasoning” when they are instead “the product of practical
reasoning” (Searle, 2001, 253). In relation to individual identity, practical reasoning then
involves taking a stance on one’s identity in a self-organizing way.
My argument here, however, avoids claims about practical reasoning capacities, because
it is framed only in terms of what we need to say about agents if we suppose the economy
is a reflexive process. What I claim we need to say is that their adjustment behavior is
self-organizing, and this involves not only their revising their behavior in light of their
expectations of the future, but also revising it in such a way as to function as individuals.

6

A sea battle tomorrow?

My goal in this paper was to explain how the behavior and identity of individual reflexive
economic agents might be understood as an alternative to the standard utility conception
of agents. My explanation depends on understanding the economic process as reflexive,
and I explain reflexive economic processes in terms of the adjustment behavior of
reflexive economic agents. What I say about this process and agent conception is that
they are both open in the sense that action affects the world, and thus occur in beforeand-after time, so that what is the case in the world depends on action in a non-fatalistic
way.

So my assumption – one it seems not held by many economists – is that

explanations in economics need to be adequate to our most basic views about the
relationship between time and action. An implication of these views is that the future is
not determined. Whether, as Aristotle asked, there will be the equivalent of a sea battle
tomorrow depends on the actions people undertake in advance of tomorrow. This can be
seen in how our judgments about what is true or false are susceptible to reversal according
to what we do, as demonstrated, albeit in a highly stylized and simplified way, by SFPs
and SDPs. Of course, many of our beliefs about what is true and false about the world are
16

Self-centered welfare concerns one’s own self-interest, self-welfare goal concerns one’s own welfare, which may
include own-welfare enhancing sympathy for others, and self-goal choice concerns one’s own non-welfare goals.
See Hedoin (2016, forthcoming) for a discussion of the relation of Sen’s different levels of the self to revealed
preference theory.

24

unstable and contested, so some might say this explanatory strategy is overly ambitious.
One might then be tempted to despair about making time central to economics, and
retreat to the discourse of mathematical equilibrium models that set time and realism
aside. However, such a retreat, I suggest, only confirms the openness of the economy
since its object is to close our explanations, and one can only close something that is open.
What can we then accomplish in this uncertain scientific environment? I have tried to
argue that agents’ pursuit of individual identity remains one relatively certain
phenomenon.

My argument for this turns on whether we believe agents are self-

organizing and engage in an adjustment behavior in which they act upon themselves. The
motivation for this view was the bounded individuality idea. If individuality in what
different forms it takes is the product of action, then it is bounded in a reflexive way by
that action, just as in behavioral explanations rationality is bounded in a reflexive way by
its own mechanisms. Simon was the original proponent of the bounded rationality idea.
But his self-organizing systems idea, once applied to individual agents, allows us to extend
the bounded rationality idea to the idea of bounded individuality. This paper aimed to
develop that account by framing it explicitly in identity terms on the assumption that any
systematic account of economic agents needs to be framed in those terms.
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